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This paper compares the performance of a convoy banking system, sim-
ilar to that whch prevailed in Japan, to a ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance
regime. Under this system, failed banks are merged with healthy banks,
rather than closed, so that the banking system itself provides the safety
net for guaranteed deposits. While neither regime is generally preferable
over the other, the results show that the performance of the convoy system
is more sensitive to changes in bank charter values and the overall health
of the banking system. The recent breakdown of the convoy system may
therefore be partly attributable to adverse changes in these characteristics
in the Japanese banking system.
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own.1. Introduction
The performance of the Japanese banking system in the 1990s has been extremely
disappointing. Banks suﬀered severe losses due to the collapse of asset prices
at the close of the 1980s,resulting in a large increase in bank failures over the
decade. The frequency of these failures eventually exhausted the funds of the
Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC). Moreover,the pace of recovery has been
slow. As of September 1998,estimates of bad loans in Japan’s banking sector
still exceeded 7 percent of GDP [Hoshi and Kashyap ([6],1999)].
This paper examines whether the system of resolving bank failures in Japan,
commonly referred to as the ”convoy system,” may have played a role in the
system’s poor performance. Under this system,failing banks were merged with
healthy banks rather than liquidated,such that the banking system itself provided
the safety net for deposit guarantees. Below,I introduce a simple model of the
convoy system. Failed banks are merged with healthy banks,with deposits
carried at par values. Moral hazard arises in the model,as banks are faced with
a choice of the magnitude of costly eﬀort to extend towards enhancing the quality
of their portfolios. Limited liability and deposit guarantees combine to reduce
the incentive for individual banks to undertake increased eﬀort.
The eﬀort obtained under the convoy system is then compared to that un-
der a ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance regime with similar moral hazard issues
introduced. Under the deposit insurance regime,failed banks are liquidated and
deposits are paid through the deposit insurance fund. In contrast to the con-
voy regime,the liquidation of failed banks under the deposit insurance system is
assumed to result in the loss in bank charter value.To provide a fair comparison of the convoy and deposit insurance regimes,one
would want to construct the most desirable convoy regime possible. The con-
voy system entertained here is an improvement over those considered in Spiegel
(1999). Spiegel (1999) considered two potential convoy systems,a pure random-
ized system and a paired ”best-with-worst” system. Each of these had diﬃculties.
In the case of the random system,the system had the undesirable attribute that
marginally solvent banks could be forced into bankruptcy by being paired with
very insolvent failing banks. The feasibility of that system was therefore ques-
tionable. The paired ”best-with-worst” system had the undesirable attribute of
introducing excessive moral hazard into the system. Under the paired convoy
system,each marginal increase in bank eﬀort was penalized in expected value by
an increase in the expected losses from being paired with a failed bank.
The system derived below combines pairing with randomizing to construct a
feasible system with less moral hazard than the ”best-with-worst” system. Under
the convoy system derived in this paper,assignment of failed banks takes place in
two steps: Subsequent to the realization of uncertainty,the regulator identiﬁes
a group of banks with suﬃcient asset positions to acquire individual insolvent
banks. These banks form a ”pool of potential applicants.” Assignment of each
bank within this pool is then done on a randomized basis. The convoy system
here is to some extent ”paired,” in the sense that marginally-solvent banks are
excused from the acquisition of insolvent banks. However,the randomization
within the pool of potential acquiring banks reduces the marginal disincentive
banks faced under the paired system for increased eﬀort.
Neither the convoy regime nor the deposit insurance regime is universally dom-
inant in terms of moral hazard. Instead,the relative performance of the convoy
2system is dependent on the overall health of the banking system and the ability
of bank regulators to adequately compensate acquiring banks. Through compar-
ative static exercises,I demonstrate that the convoy regime is more sensitive to
changes both bank charter values and the overall health of the banking system
than the deposit insurance regime. As a result,reductions in either bank char-
ter values or the overall health of the ﬁnancial system deteriorates the relative
performance of the convoy system. These theoretical results are conﬁrmed in
simulation exercises.
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. The next section
discusses conditions leading to the breakdown of the convoy system. Section 3
introduces a simple model of the convoy system. Section 4 derives a simple model
of a ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance benchmark against which the performance
of the convoy system can be compared. Section ﬁve conducts simulation exercises
of the convoy and deposit insurance regimes. Section six concludes.
2. Breakdown of the convoy banking system
The convoy system has its origins in the ”main bank” system,which prevailed
in Japan throughout the post-war era.1 U n d e rt h i ss y s t e m ,aﬁ r mw o u l dh a v ea
special long-term relationship with a bank,usually that which acted as its primary
source of ﬁnancing. In addition,the main banks usually held equity in their client
ﬁrms. The complex interactions between ﬁrms and banks under this system left a
large degree of systemic risk associated with the failure of any of its components.
Regulators responded to this systemic risk by limiting the growth and branch-
1For background on the Japanese main bank system, see Aoki, Patrick and Sheard ([1], 1994).
3ing of any individual bank in the system. All banks in the system were con-
strained to grow at roughly the same pace,similar to how ships in a convoy must
move at the pace of their slowest members. These branching restrictions created
monopoly rents within the banking system,as the right to open new branches
carried value to banks.2
In addition,the convoy system placed the burden of resolution of bank failures
on the banking system itself. In the event of a bank failure,regulators merged
the failing bank with a healthy bank,rather than liquidating its assets. The
acquiring bank received a failed bank with a negative value balance sheet,as
well as the failed bank’s branching rights. In addition,the cooperation of the
acquiring bank probably brought some informal value in terms of expected future
regulatory treatment by the Ministry of Finance.
This system endured for an extended period of time. However,a number of
developments led to its decline. First,ﬁnancial liberalization,which had been
taking place since the 1970’s,eroded the value of monopoly rents in the banking
sector,including the value of branching rights obtained by acquiring failed banks
[Hoshi and Kashyap,([6],1999)]. Hoshi ( [5],1999) demonstrates that Japanese
bank proﬁtability,which was positively correlated with branch numbers in the
early period of the convoy program,was negatively related to the number of bank
branches during the late 1980s and 1990s. These developments reduced the value
of side payments banks received as a result of acquisition of a failed bank.
Second,the frequency of bank failures grew dramatically in the 1990s,as
banks suﬀered severe losses stemming from the collapse of Japanese asset prices.
These failures quickly eroded the funds of the DIC and hampered the ability of
2See Hoshi and Kashyap, ([6], 1999) for details.
4regulators to negotiate mergers of failed banks. For example,the merger of Tokyo
Kyozo and Anzen Bank in 1995 was partly ﬁnanced by both the private banking
system and subsidized loans from the Tokyo metropolitan government. Similarly,
the DIC contributed only 100 billion of the estimated 240 billion yen needed to
ﬁnance the resolution of the failed Cosmo Credit Corporation [Cargill,et al ([2],
1997)]. The public also responded negatively to government contributions to the
resolution of the failed ”jusen” bank subsidiaries.3
As the DIC funds were depleted,the government was forced to abandon the
policy of rescuing failed banks. The Hyogo Bank’s closure in 1995 represented
the ﬁrst Japanese bank liquidation in 70 years [Yamori,([12],1999)]. When the
Hanwa bank closed in 1996,an attempt to ﬁnd an acquiring bank was not even
made. The assets of the bank were placed in the Resolution and Collection Bank
to be liquidated and the government promised to guarantee bank deposits. The
breakdown of the convoy scheme was complete.
The convoy scheme was viable as long as banks could be forced or ade-
quately compensated for acquiring failed banks. However the liberalization of
the Japanese ﬁnancial system and the poor performance of the Japanese bank-
ing system over the 1990s threatened the capacity of regulators to adequately
compensate banks for providing the safety net against bank failure.
3For details of the failures of the jusen banks, see Milhaupt and Miller [ [9], (1997)] and
Rosenbluth and Thies [[10],(1998)].
53. A simple model of a convoy banking system
This section develops a model of a convoy system similar to that described above
in which the burden of resolution of failed banks is placed on the banking system.
Failed banks are merged with adequately solvent banks rather than closed. Banks
are considered adequately solvent to serve as acquiring banks if they can acquire
the most insolvent banks without facing bankruptcy themselves.
Banks are assumed to be homogeneous. There are an inﬁnite amount of homo-
geneous banks of ﬁxed size which is set at measure zero for notational simplicity.
Banks choose a level of ”eﬀort,” µi, to undertake to enhance the quality of
their lending portfolios. Eﬀort is assumed to have a cost function V (µ), where
Vµ > 0 and Vµµ > 0. For simplicity,eﬀort costs are assumed to be borne up front.
This simpliﬁes the analysis by making this cost independent of the probability of
bankruptcy,but drives none of the results. 4
As in Marcus ([8],1984), it is assumed that if the bank is allowed to continue,
i th a sac h a r t e rv a l u eo fC,which is taken as exogenous. Bank charter value is
assumed to represent the expected future proﬁts from continued banking opera-
tions,perhaps due to branching rights. It is assumed that bank charter values
are not incorporated in the regulator’s closure rule.
The model has one period. The timing of the model is as follows: First,
each bank chooses its individual eﬀort level, µi. Banks are assumed to play Nash,
taking the eﬀort choice of the rest of the banking system, µ, as given and moving
simultaneously.
4For similar approaches to modelling moral hazrd, see Dewatripont and Tirole ( [3], 1993),
Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington ([4], 1993) and Kasa and Spiegel ([7], 1999).
6Second,each bank i is hit with an idiosyncratic shock, εi.ε i is assumed to
be symmetrically distributed on the interval [ε,ε] with density function f (εi) and
expected value 0. Net asset value, Ai, is assumed to be a function of bank eﬀort
and the realization of the idiosyncratic shock according to the formula
Ai = A(µi)+εi (3.1)
where Aµ > 0,A µµ < 0.
Third,the regulator makes its closure decision. Banks are closed if their net
asset value falls below zero. Deﬁne ε∗ as the minimum realization of ε which
l e a v e sab a n kw i t he ﬀ o r tl e v e lµ solvent. ε∗ satisﬁes
ε
∗ = −A(µ). (3.2)
Note that ε∗ is decreasing in µ, ε∗
µ < 0,ε ∗
µµ > 0.
The regulator then pairs each failed bank with a solvent acquiring bank. Bank
pairings are assumed to take place in two steps. First,the regulator identiﬁes
the set of ”potential acquiring banks,” deﬁned as the set of banks which could
acquire any of the failed banks in the system without becoming insolvent.
See Figure 1. All banks with negative realizations of A will be insolvent. Let
A represent the most insolvent failed bank. In equilibrium, A will satisfy
A = A(µ)+ε. (3.3)
Deﬁne  A as the ”marginal acquiring bank,” the bank with the lowest value
of A which can acquire bank A without being forced into bankruptcy itself.  A
satisﬁes
 A = ε − A(µ) (3.4)
7All banks with realizations of A which exceed  A a r et h e ni nt h e” p o o lo f
potential acquiring banks.” The regulator is assumed to pair the failed banks
with banks within this pool randomly. A suﬃcient condition for the convoy
system to be sustainable is that the number of banks within the potential pool
exceed the number of failed banks.
I next turn to the decision problem faced by the representative bank. Deﬁne
 εi as the realization of ε which leaves a bank with eﬀort level µi with asset value
 A. By equation (3.4),  εi satisﬁes
 εi = ε − A(µ) − A(µi). (3.5)
Note that  εi is decreasing in both µ and µi. An increase in µ increases the
value of A, reducing the value of  A, and hence the realization of  εi, which would
leave a bank in the potential acquiring pool. An increase in µi raises the value
of Ai given any realization of ε. as a result,it reduces the value of  εi.
For realizations of ε above  εi, the representative bank will be in the potential
acquiring pool. Since the regulator randomizes over the set of banks in the pool
when making its allocation decision,the probability of a bank in the pool actually
being paired with a failed bank is equal to the number of failed banks divided by
the number of banks in the acquiring pool. Deﬁne Ψr as the probability-weighted







(A(µ)+C + ε)f (ε)dε

. (3.6)
The left term represents the probability of being paired with a failed bank
contingent on being in the potential acquiring pool. The right term reﬂects the
expected cost of acquiring a failed bank. Note that the cost of acquiring a failed
8bank is reduced by the charter value of the acquired bank and is independent of
the eﬀort level chosen by the representative bank. The only impact of a change
in the eﬀort level of the representative bank, µi, is through its impact on  εi and
hence the eﬀect on the probability of landing in the pool of potential acquiring
banks.
The representative bank’s investment decision is then to choose µi to maximize
















i and  εi are the realizations of ε necessary to reach solvency and qualify






















The ﬁrst term reﬂects the change in expected net asset value with increased
eﬀort over solvency states. The second term represents the value of the decrease
in the probability of bankruptcy which stems from a marginal increase in eﬀort.
The third term reﬂects the change in the probability of being assigned a failed
bank with a marginal increase in eﬀort. The ﬁnal term reﬂects the marginal cost
of eﬀort.
This solution represents a number of sources of moral hazard. First,because
of limited liability,expected bank value is independent of bank payoﬀs for real-
izations of ε below ε∗
i. Consequently,any potential improvements from increases
in bank eﬀort over this range do not enter into the bank’s maximization decision.
9Second,the convoy system penalizes a bank for reaching a net asset value which
qualiﬁes as an acquiring bank. In this sense,the convoy system actually taxes
marginal eﬀort increases. An increase in µi raises the expected value of Ai, and
therefore increases the probability that the bank will be asked to acquire a failed
bank.
However,the equilibrium level of bank eﬀort is increasing in C, bank charter
values. Bank charter values aﬀect eﬀort through two distinct channels: The
second argument shows that an increase in a banks own charter values raises the
return from avoiding bankruptcy,while the third argument demonstrates that an
increase in bank system charter values decreases the expected losses from acquiring
a failed bank.
We next turn towards the equilibrium solution. In equilibrium, µi = µ for all















It is shown in the appendix that the second-order condition may not be satis-
ﬁed in aggregate. This result stems from the spillover eﬀect aggregate bank eﬀort
has on the burden faced by an individual bank under the convoy scheme. An
increase in aggregate bank eﬀort reduces the expected cost of acquiring a failed
bank. Holding all else equal,this increases individual bank eﬀort. If this spillover
were suﬃciently large,there would be increasing returns to scale in bank eﬀort
and banks would not have an interior solution for eﬀort levels. The condition for
an interior solution is derived in the appendix.
Assuming that the payoﬀ to eﬀort is concave,we can investigate the compara-
tive static eﬀects of a change in bank charter value. Diﬀerentiating equation (3.9)












f (ε)dε > 0 (3.10)
This leads to Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 1 :With aggregate concavity, dµ/dC > 0.











The aggregate second order term, ∂Λ/∂µ, and the conditions for aggregate
concavity are derived in the appendix.
There are two arguments in the numerator of equation (3.11) which drive
the results in Proposition 1. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the positive impact of in-
creased charter values on a bank’s own continuation value. As charter value
increases,banks are willing to undergo more eﬀort to avoid bankruptcy because
their expected future earnings are higher. The second term reﬂects the decreases
in expected losses from the convoy system with increased bank charter values.
Holding bank asset values constant,an increase in bank charter values reduces
the cost of acquiring an insolvent bank. This reduces the penalty that the convoy
system places on banks that perform well.
The impact of a change in the overall health of the banking system can be seen
by running a comparative static exercise on A(µ), holding µ constant. Holding
all else equal,an increase in A(µ) raises the overall performance of the banking





















11The ﬁrst term is positive,reﬂecting the increased probability of solvency states
with increased A(µ). The third term is also positive,reﬂecting the decreased
probability of bankruptcy in the banking system,and hence a decrease in the
expected burden of the convoy program,with increased A(µ). However,the
second term is negative,reﬂecting a decrease in the density of the realization of
ε∗.





















With aggregate concavity, dµ/dA(µ) will be positive if the second term in
equation (3.13) is not too large. In particular,the uniform distribution considered
for ε in the simulations below are suﬃcient but not necessary to obtain this result.
This implies that an increase in the overall health of the banking system induces
increased bank eﬀort.
4. Fixed-Premium deposit insurance benchmark
To examine the impact of the convoy regime on the severity of moral hazard in
banking decisions,it is necessary to compare that regime to another system for
resolving bank failure. In this section,I derive bank decisions under a stan-
dard ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance regime and compare those decisions to the
convoy program.
The set-up is similar to that above. The model has one period. The timing of
the model is as follows: First,the bank pays its deposit insurance premium,which
is determined below,and chooses its eﬀort level,again taking the equilibrium eﬀort
12decision of the of the rest of the banking system as given. Second,each bank i
is hit with its idiosyncratic shock, εi. Finally,the bank regulator is assumed to
close the bank if it is insolvent. I assume that unlike the convoy system,closed
banks are liquidated under the ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance system. I also
assume that bank charter values are lost to the banking system as a result of a
bank closure.5
Deﬁne µd and ε∗
d as bank eﬀort and minimum survival level respectively under
the deposit-insurance system. The ”fair” bank deposit insurance premium, Ψd,






Note that since the representative bank is small relative to the entire banking
system Ψd is a function of µd, but not a function of µdi.
The representative bank’s investment decision is to choose µdi to maximize Π,





(A(µdi)+ε + C)f (ε)dε +
 ε∗
ε
(A(µd)+ε)f (ε)dε − V (µdi) (4.2)















5One might argue that the banking system as a whole might be able to recover some of
the liquidated bank’s charter value.For example, the value of surviving banks’ branching
rights may be enhanced by the reduced number of branches subsequent to liquidation of the
failed banks.However, these gains will not enter into the consideration of the representative
Nash-playing bank.
13since ∂Ψd/∂µdi =0 .
The two arguments on the left-hand side of equation (4.3) represent the marginal
beneﬁts of additional eﬀort. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the increased expected payoﬀ
in non-bankruptcy states,holding the probability of bankruptcy constant. The
second term reﬂects the value of the change in the probability of bankruptcy which
results from a marginal change in eﬀort.
Again,with homogeneity, µdi = µd for all banks in the system in equilibrium.
















The appendix demonstrates that aggregate concavity holds under the ﬁxed-
premium deposit insurance regime if the individual bank second order condition
is satisﬁed. Given aggregate concavity,we can again investigate the comparative
static eﬀects of a change in bank charter value. Diﬀerentiating equation (4.4) with










d) > 0 (4.5)










As in the random convoy system,an increase in bank charter values increases
bank eﬀort under the ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance system. A comparison of
equations (3.11) and (4.6) leads to Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: With positive spillover eﬀects, dµ/dC ≥ dµd/dC.
14Proposition 2 states that bank eﬀort levels are more sensitive to changes
in bank charter values under the random convoy system than under the ﬁxed-
premium deposit insurance system for given levels of bank eﬀort.
The positive spillover eﬀect condition requires that the expected burden of
acquiring a failed bank is decreasing in µ, the average eﬀort level in the banking
system. The conditions for this positive spillover eﬀect,which would be expected
to hold under normal circumstances,are shown in the appendix. This condition
is a suﬃcient,but not necessary condition for Proposition 2 to hold.
Given that the spillover eﬀect is positive,one can see from the concavity condi-
tions in the appendix that |∂Λ/∂µ|≤| ∂Λd/∂µ|. Since an increase in bank charter
value also reduces the expected cost of acquiring a failed bank,the numerator in
equation (3.11) is greater than that in equation (4.6). It therefore follows that
equilibrium bank eﬀort levels will be more sensitive to bank charter values under
the convoy program than under the ﬁxed-premium deposit insurance program.
As in the case of the random convoy system,we can also investigate the impact
of an increase in the overall health of the banking system by doing a comparative
































Comparing equations (4.7) and (3.12),the numerator under the convoy system
has an extra term reﬂecting the decreased expected burden under the convoy
15program from an increase in the overall health of the banking system. This leads
to Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: When spillover eﬀects are positive and dµ/dA(µ) ≥ 0,
dµ/dA(µ) ≥dµ/dA(µ).
Proposition 3 states that bank eﬀort levels are more sensitive to changes in
banking system health under the random convoy system than under the ﬁxed-
premium deposit insurance system for given levels of bank eﬀort. The positive
spillover condition is again a suﬃcient,but not necessary condition for |∂Λ/∂µ|≤
|∂Λd/∂µ|. The condition that dµ/dA(µ) ≥ 0 is again satisﬁed by the second term
in equation (4.8) not being too large. Again,the uniform distribution assumption
for ε below is suﬃcient,but not necessary,to satisfy this condition. Given these
conditions,the proof follows directly from larger numerator in equation (4.8).
5. Simulations
5.1. Functional forms
The previous section identiﬁed two features which distinguish the ﬁxed-premium
deposit insurance system from the convoy system under fairly general conditions.
The level of bank eﬀort under the convoy system is predicted to be more sensi-
tive to both changes in bank charter values and the overall health of the banking
system. In this section,I turn towards simulations to investigate these predic-
tions concerning the relative sensitivities of moral hazard under the two banking
regimes.
16I ﬁrst adopt some speciﬁc functional forms. Let the net asset position of bank
i undertaking eﬀort level µi satisfy the linear relationship
ni = α +( µi)
β + εi (5.1)
where β(0,1). Note that,as speciﬁed by the theory nµ > 0,n µµ < 0 and
nµi,εi =0 .
In addition,let the cost of eﬀort be quadratic in µ
V (µ)=νµ
2. (5.2)
Let ε be distributed uniform on the unit interval [−1,1].
Finally,only a certain range of values of C achieve an interior solution for the
probability of default. I limit C to the range where the probability of default is
positive,but less than one.
Substituting the functional forms into equations (5.1) and (5.2) into the convoy
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Let µd and ε∗
d represent the values of µ and ε∗ under the ﬁxed-premium deposit
insurance system respectively. Substituting the functional forms in equations










d − (1 + α +2 C)=0 (5.4)
5.2. Results
Parameter values were chosen to yield interior solutions to equations (5.3) and
(5.4) with a positive probability of both failure and solvency. I ran two sets of
17simulations; one examines the impact of changes in C,bank charter values,and
one examines the impact of changes in α, which reﬂects a shift in A(µ) and hence
the overall health of the banking system for given values of µ. In both simulations
Is e tβ =0 .5 and ν =1 .7. The ﬁrst set of simulations sets α = −0.1, while the
second ﬁxes C =0 .1.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the impact of increases in bank charter values
on bank eﬀort and the probability of bankruptcy respectively. Bank eﬀort is
increasing in bank charter value for both the convoy and the deposit insurance
regimes. However,consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1,the convoy
regime is more sensitive to increases in bank charter values than the deposit in-
surance regime. At suﬃciently high bank charter values,bank eﬀort is actually
higher (and bankruptcy probability lower) under the convoy regime than the de-
posit insurance regime.
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the impact of increases in the overall health of
the banking system on bank eﬀort and the probability of bankruptcy respectively.
Increases in overall bank health raises eﬀort under both the convoy and the de-
posit insurance system. However,consistent with the prediction of Proposition
2,the convoy regime is more sensitive to changes in the health of the banking
system than the deposit insurance system. As in the case of bank charter values,
suﬃciently high banking system health can induce greater eﬀort under the convoy
system than the deposit insurance system.
186. Conclusion
This paper introduces a method of resolving bank failures within the banking
system itself,similar to the convoy banking system which prevailed in Japan
throughout the post-war era. The resolution method chosen combined attributes
of selection and randomness. A pool of potential acquiring banks were selected on
the basis of their capacity to acquire failed banks without experiencing ﬁnancial
diﬃculties themselves. Actual acquiring banks were then chosen at random from
the pool.
The performance of the convoy system in the model above was not universally
inferior to the deposit insurance benchmark. For certain conditions,particularly
those with large values of branching rights and a healthy banking system,the con-
voy bank resolution system performed competitively relative to a ﬁxed-premium
deposit insurance system.
However,the convoy system was shown to be more sensitive to changes in bank
charter values and the overall health of the banking system than its ﬁxed-premium
deposit insurance counterpart. As a result,when these conditions declined,we
found the convoy system being outperformed by the deposit insurance system.
The decline of the convoy system in Japan over the last decade may be related
to such changes in these characteristics. First,bank charter values have declined
markedly from the earlier heavily-regulated era. Second,the banking system
has experienced severe diﬃculties,raising the cost of the burden borne by those
providing resolution of bank failures. Our model predicts that banks would
respond to these changes by decreasing their eﬀort,resulting in increased default
risk in the banking system. It can be seen that under the convoy system,this
19moral hazard feeds on itself,as reduced eﬀort of individual banks decreases the
returns to eﬀort of other banks. Eventually,moral hazard can be suﬃciently
pervasive that the convoy system is no longer viable.
20A. Appendix: Aggregate concavity
A.1. Convoy system


















































































The sign is ambiguous. While the ﬁrst four terms can be signed as negative by
the second-order condition of the individual representative bank’s eﬀort decision,
there is an additional term,reﬂecting the spillover eﬀects on a rep resentative
bank’s value from a marginal increase in aggregate bank eﬀort.
This term reﬂects the impact of an increase in µ on the expected burden of
the convoy system. The ﬁrst term is positive. Increased eﬀort by the banking
industry as a whole reduces the expected cost of acquiring failed banks as the
expected net asset values of failed banks increase. However,the second term is
negative,as an increase in overall bank eﬀort reduces the probability of a bank
21being asked to participate in the convoy system. At the margin,since banks have
zero net value but positive charter value,acquisition of these banks has a positive
impact on bank value. In net,the spillover eﬀect is positive when the ﬁrst term
outweighs the second,i.e. when
 ε∗
ε
f (ε)dε ≥ Cf (ε
∗) (A.5)
When (A.5) is positive,satisfaction of the individual bank second-order condition
is insuﬃcient to guarantee aggregate concavity. the aggregate concavity condition
then is that ∂Λ/∂µ < 0 in equation (A.4).
A.2. Deposit Insurance











































































Unlike the convoy system,satisfaction of the individual bank second order
condition guarantees aggregate concavity as well.
Finally,note that for a given value of µ, |∂Λ/∂µ| < |∂Λd/∂µ| if the spillover
eﬀect in equation (A.4) is positive.
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